



Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive

Institutional Publications

Naval Postgraduate School Barometer

1974-05-28

The Barometer / v.16-9

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School


<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/50312>



Calhoun is a project of the Dudley Knox Library at NPS, furthering the precepts and goals of open government and government transparency. All information contained herein has been approved for release by the NPS Public Affairs Officer.


Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943

<http://www.nps.edu/library>



MAY 28 1974
MONTEREY
CALIF 93040

The BAROMETER



VOL. XVI, NO. 9

28 MAY 1974

EDITORS:

LCDR Pat SHEPHERD, SMC #2614

LT Ken HOLLEMON, SMC #1181

The BAROMETER is a student weekly newspaper for the exchange of ideas and information concerning the development and improvement of the professional environment at the Naval Postgraduate School. Items of interest, papers, and articles of interest to the students, staff, and faculty as a whole are solicited.

%%***%

"What would happen if this were not done? If the answer is 'nothing,' then stop doing it." Peter Drucker The Effective Executive.

"Are we trying to do something worthwhile here or are we just building a monument to some diseased ego." Robert Townsend Up The Organization

EDITORIAL COMMENT: "Pencil pushing" was once thought to be an activity which occupied only the time of the shore duty officer, but over the years the operating manager afloat has found his time increasingly preempted by reporting requirements, often at the expense of essential combat readiness functions. The following article is extracted from a paper by LCDR Thomas S. Tollefsen, USN, which appears in the May-June 1974 issue of the Naval War College Review.

FEATURE: REPORTS OR READINESS: A DILEMMA

"Life at sea is a high adventure. The few young Americans who still go down to the sea in ships are usually rugged and outspoken in their own element. Seamen have traditionally enjoyed a high degree of tolerance coupled with a keen sense of justice. As a kinetic group, they respect authority and willingly follow the precepts of their shorebound superiors. This authority, however, when it is abused or unreasonable, inculcates a spirit of disregard by the men who man the fleet ships. Individualism remains a keystone and an essential ingredient of most effective navies, and the constraining ship administrative reports system presently in effect in our own Navy has proven to be a catalyst for resentment by fleet officers. Indeed, the cancerous growth of a cumbersome, often redundant reporting system has led many of the 90 percent of the surface junior officers who leave the fleet at their first opportunity to list the onerous administrative burden as a principal complaint. Neither is it inexplicable that career surface warfare officers in the full vigor of their professional careers seek opportunities ashore to avoid the administrative liability of senior shipboard positions.

To command a surface combatant was once a challenge and an adventure; but the administrative burden of command has so mushroomed that even a return to homeport is frequently dreaded as the prelude to yet another recurring reporting requirement. In the 2-year period from 1971 through 1973, the fleet ships experienced a 38 percent increase in their recurring reporting requirements. The surface combatant officers are frequently erudite men of varied and rich experience, and many have read former Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird's testimony to the Armed Services Committee that substantial reductions in paperwork deemed counterproductive to efficient management have been effected at all levels. As efforts were supposedly continuing to reduce reporting requirements that were not only wasteful of time and effort but not conducive to good management practice, the destroyer skipper or frustrated executive officer could only wonder why his superiors were failing to comply with the Department of Defense imperative. Not only was paperwork not reduced, but one-time spot reports, which usually matured into a recurring report of some sort, proliferated during this period, and 75 percent of those requirements were initiated by non-Washington activities. Following the poor example of their superiors and in response to the new demands for information about people, salaries, human goals, drug abuse, alcohol control, ammunition expenditures, fuel consumption, ad infinitum, 25 percent more internal ship feeder reports were generated in the naive belief that these documents would be effective management tools.

In port, ship officers and senior petty officers have become pencil pushers to a displeasurable degree. Ship officers assigned ashore seem to have forgotten their sea experiences and fail to assess the precious executive man-hours consumed in preparing reports. The clerical support on board ship is hardly adequate to meet crew administrative requirements, let alone tackle new formal reporting procedures. From the ship operator perspective, this numbing paperwork routine detracts measurably from training and material readiness tasks. Some reports may be ignored with no expectation of retribution, but the uncertainty resulting from a deliberate reports omission policy is unsettling for the destroyer skipper.

MASTERY OF NAVAL MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES

The naval reports system exists to ensure that information is passed from one echelon of command to another to allow decisionmakers to perform their prescribed functions, and a regular reporting and records system is used to produce desired behavior and, further, to cause that behavior to persist. Attention and behavior in an administrative organization, once initiated in a particular direction, tends to persist for a considerable period of time. Unfortunately, compliance without reasonable questioning by commanders of reporting units has produced a burdensome load that seems to feed on itself."

"The destroyer commanding officer has complete, final responsibility for the battle readiness of his command. Yet his work toward achieving battle readiness may be to a large degree replaced by administrative work priorities, established by his off-ship superiors. In an era where the shore-bound naval officer specialist dominates, the specialty area reports compete strongly for first priority in the time budget of the shipboard generalist. The calendar period reporting system does not allow the ship commanding officer to direct internal shipwork close to the end of the month, especially when the month's end coincides with the finish of a fiscal quarter of fiscal year. The skipper may demand compliance with his priorities but only at measurable cost in work efficiency and personal loyalty. The junior officers are forced to crowd burdensome administrative chores into extended workdays, both at sea and in port. Duty nights in port are dedicated to administrative projects to the detriment of running efficient watch sections. The penalty for this is apparent--junior officers swiftly exit to civilian life where family commitments need not be ignored to satisfy often needless administrative requirements.

Recent studies of administrative behavior by Professor David A. Kolb, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, revealed that managers tend to judge subordinates' performance on relatively small samples of their work experience. The human mind is a clever mechanism that tends to erase unpleasant experiences over a period of time and recall only the best of personal achievements. The middle echelon commander recalls and compares his own successes to the perceived failures of his subordinates at similar tasks. However, this simple theory yields rather poor predictions and subordinate echelon managers spend substantial time solving problems defined by others. Middle managers often unjustly rate subordinates low in responsibility, judgment, and initiative. They attempt to ensure their own importance by holding on to information, maintaining close control and reserving the right to make decisions. The superior echelon commander in turn demands management information for those decisions he reserves unto himself. Therefore, this situational law can be seen as a prime reason for many of the recurring reports. As a bureaucratic organization, the Navy does not reward managers for inclusion of subordinates in decisionmaking. Information to make decisions is demanded from the ships, but just as in industry, this information is frequently misused or ignored. Heuristic decisions are common even when adequate analysis information is available.

A conjugate management principle is that control is an additive and expanding phenomena. Once an agency or staff gains access to an operating unit for regular reports information, their span of control widens and additional reporting requirement proliferate."

"In 1971 the Vice Chief of Naval Operations requested that the Naval Audit Service perform a special audit on fleet reporting and related paperwork. The purpose of this audit was to appraise and evaluate reporting requirements and to recommend ways to improve the system, reduce related paperwork, and to eliminate unjustified reporting requirements. This tasking preceded Secretary Laird's recognition of excessive paperwork requirements and reveals high level Navy management concern with the paperwork mess. General policy directives had required a continuing and systematic review of all reports to assure that they are meaningful contributions with an emphasis on minimum effort and cost, but, as suggested earlier, the force of this directive simply did not penetrate to the operating fleet level. The Naval Audit Service summarized by noting that these reviews, when performed, had little long-range effect on the spiraling paperwork loads. They also found that the cost and complexity of the Navy reporting system is consistently increasing because more and more detailed reports are demanded of subordinate commanders. The Audit Service analyzed 147 specific reporting requirements and found that 24 percent were redundant and cost the Navy an estimated \$2,057,649. By August 1973 the number of required recurring reports had increased to 160, with additional costs. Fleet officers are not so concerned with dollar costs involved as they are in the waste of ships' officers time on nonproductive administrative tasks which adversely affect operational readiness.

SHIP PRODUCTIVITY ANALYSIS. U.S. Navy ships face a manpower 'crunch' and today we find that shipboard personnel are doing less to ensure ship readiness for combat. For naval personnel the term 'productivity' has little meaning as no measurements of productive effort have been introduced to the fleet. Certainly the volume of reports leaving the ship are not a measure of ship productivity."

"The reports system was devised to influence and control behavior, as well as provide data to higher level managers. The reports system, a poor substitute for eyeball contact, serves as a barrier to communications and therefore to genuine interaction. The transient nature of our ship operations is recognized but the inability of shore-bound staff personnel to interact with ships company, except through a formal reporting system, is detrimental to ship readiness. At any rate, information can be communicated orally in 30 minutes that takes 10 hours to produce in a formal written report, a ratio of 20:1! Here is where productivity gains can be realized in regular administrative functions.

Witness our 3-M system. Originally simple and clever, the addition of a plethora of reporting requirements covering all phases of maintenance management has made the system counterproductive. Negative motivation to accomplish and report maintenance has been introduced in the form of frequent and demanding inspections. Because the clerical functions of the 3-M reporting system are routine and repetitive and are the overly directed responsibility of a senior petty officer or junior officer, support for the system has dwindled in the fleet. The 3-M system should be an excellent vehicle for measuring the maintenance performance of enlisted technicians and the scheduling ability of officers, but the monotony of filling out multiple maintenance forms has lessened work satisfaction at all levels and adversely affected productivity.

Reports that are an end in themselves are given only cursory treatment by those to whom they are directed. Reports that are a part of the control system-not just for accountability, but also for getting the job done-serve both as insurance to the middle manager and as tools for the supervisor. There is little return to the ship in the form of useful maintenance data being provided by the 3-M system. Maintenance data printouts are returned weeks late and not in a useful format. Consequently, this reporting system does not achieve its measurable goals, and productivity is not enhanced."

"Information in the Navy has always been free to anyone in the upper echelons making demands on the ship. But if the information is genuinely important to the claimant, then the information has a value that can be translated into manhour dollars. Naval Safety Center accident reports, for example, each require about 8 hours of officer preparation, review and yeoman clerical time. At a flat rate of \$6 per hour, such a report costs \$48. The Safety Center should be obligated to pay the ship, through the type commander, on OPTAR transfer of \$48 for each report received. The requesting agency will soon learn the value of sampling techniques or exception reporting to develop data banks for decisionmaking.

A precedent does exist for this cost application method. In July 1973 the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed an inventory of interagency reports as a basis for reimbursement. Rejustification for internal requirements was required as well as vigorous questioning of external requirements. The General Services Administration acted as a clearing house and licensing agency prior to levy of the interagency reporting requirement. Investment figures (report costs) were determined by GSA, to be paid by interagency fund transfers. Specific report reductions were not established, but reductions in data and information requirements are to be reported to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) in June 1974. This round turn by DOD on Washington agencies has great potential for the fleet."

"Continuation of the present reporting system would only aggravate the communications barrier between the generalist ship operator and the specialist ashore and wall off any sense of immediacy or action. A Chief of Naval Operations policy statement on reports management is needed to codify servicewide changes with a minimum of disruption. With the support of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleet Commanders, the type commanders' function as the sole administrative commander for ships should be affirmed. As a control methodology, the symbolized reporting control system could serve as a licensing control number. By type commander edict, no reports would be submitted without prior licensing after a careful annual review of alternate methods and ship time budgets. The type commander would assign chargeable costs to each report for ships to pass on to agencies requesting information on a one-time or recurring basis.

An annual review of licensed reports would be conducted by the Navy Records Management Bureau working with the Navy Inspector General. The Navy Inspector General reviews the various type commanders for compliance with CNO policy. This expansion of his usual material inspection and police role could be aided by the Fleet Commander's administrative assist team which would provide regular information to the Inspector General and the Fleet Commander in the reports area."

"A reports management system that is effective will have productive fallout for the ship operator. The most experienced and knowledgeable ship personnel, free of the unnecessary clerical burden, would have time to teach, train, and prepare their crews for the ship warfare mission. The benefits of canceling each report would also be multiplied since countless

daily feeder reports are also eliminated. Best of all, eyeball contact would be increased those submitting and receiving reports. Key people on the ship would have the freedom to get out around the working and living areas to relate daily to the technicians, supervisors, and junior officers.

As the effect of costed information becomes felt within the naval bureaucracy, the efficacy and usefulness of exception reporting will be realized. Regular operating costs and data can be estimated or retrieved from data files. Management should be interested in taking lessons from better or worse than expected conditions, reported only by exception. Sampling theory also requires emphasis in the fleet as the 5 percent sample report does yield worthwhile and useful information.

* * * * *

The naval officer, much like his civilian managerial counterpart, must look to ways of increasing officer and crew member productivity to meet the mission requirements of the organization. An effective first step is education in fundamental management principles, price of information, penalty costs, opportunity loss, and reporting methods that emphasize exception reporting techniques and sampling theories. A viable reports control management method will go far in restoring our professional image and enhancing combat readiness."

FEATURE: DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE MOVE OF BUPERS TO NEW ORELANS

THE New Orleans view: The U.S. Navy is moving section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel to the New Orleans area-a huge relocation expected to infuse \$90 million in capital expenditures and a \$30 million annual payroll into the area's economy. U.S. Rep. F. Edward Hebert announced the relocation in Washington Tuesday, calling the concentration of Navy money and effort here "the biggest in my memory, and I think the biggest of all time." "The economic impact upon our area will be significant," he said.

The relocation of the bureau's detailing, assignment and support sections from Washington to the New Orleans area represent the third major military spending project for the area in recent months. Other projects include the expenditure of \$17 million to \$20 million at the 8th Naval Support Activity in Algiers-including the construction of a \$15 million hospital there-and the \$40 million consolidation of all Naval and Marine Reserve activities at the old Port of Embarkation in New Orleans. Both of these projects are well underway. The newest project will most benefit Plaquemines Parish and Belle Chasse, said Hebert Tuesday, as the Bureau of Naval Personnel activities are scheduled to be relocated at Alvin Callender Naval Air Station in Belle Chasse. The move will bring a burst of construction activity to the area, he said, the most intense in the form a new \$25 million administration building to be built on the base. In addition, he said, another \$23 million will be spent on the construction of 300 new homes there.

About 1,100 military and civilian families will move to the area with their jobs, and another 500 permanent civilian jobs are expected to be vacated by those who choose not to move, said Hebert. Despite the enormous expenditures, the move will prove to be economical in the long run, said Hebert. He characterized it as the logical extension of the relocation of other Naval activities to New Orleans. Hebert said the relocation will eliminate 250 employees and may reduce the bureau's year to year expenditures. The Navy is already organizing itself for the move to New Orleans and should be almost completely moved by late next year, he said. He added that all three of the Navy's major projects scheduled for New Orleans should be completed by 1977, representing an annual payroll by then of almost \$100 million.

Hebert, chairman of the powerful House Armed Services Committee, was jubilant as he explained the impact of the relocation during a telephone interview from Washington, D.C.. Asked if any more important Naval or Marine functions might be transferred to New Orleans, he joked, "I can't think of any more at the moment."

The Washington view: LOUISIANA FAVORED BY DEFENSE. Pentagon units based here and around the country are studying the advantages of relocation to the New Orleans area. In addition to being a thriving metropolis famed for its pleasant living and fine French cuisine, the Crescent City is also the legal voting residence of F. Edward Hebert, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.

Hebert (pronounced "A Bear" if you want to do it right) is the unbeatable 30-plus year veteran of Congress, an expert on the military and the man generals and admirals must please whether they want more billets, bullets or belt buckles. There is no solid evidence that the tough Democrat has ever leaned on the Army, Navy or Air Force to consider enriching the New Orleans job market as his predecessor, the late L. Mendel Rivers sometimes did in making South Carolina a natural relocation spot for federal civilian and military installations. But military men, partly via conditioned reflex and partly through plain old hore sense, have the message. When Hebert took over the chairmanship of the powerful Committee, New Orleans had just over 13,000 federal civilians. That number has grown just a little more than 1,000 in the past four years, but more employees-most of them from Defense-are on the way. Navy is planning to move the bulk of its 2,400 civilian-military workers assigned to the Bureau of Personnel to the New Orleans area within the next three and a half years. About 1,900 jobs will gradually be moved from this area and units in Bainbridge, Md., Norfolk, Va., and San

Diego.

Official reason for the shift southward is to "colocate" people with automated equipment which is being set up in New Orleans. The choice of New Orleans as the colocation, Pentagon aides say, was helped by the fact that Hebert hails from those parts. Earlier, Navy shifted a relatively small outfit from land-locked Nebraska, which is poorly represented on both the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, to New Orleans, which is well represented by Hebert.

Finance units of several Defense agencies are now studying the feasibility of quarters and facilities in New Orleans, and some reserve functions will also get orders to move in the near future.

The first article was taken from a local New Orleans paper and the second one from a local Washington, D.C. paper.